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Civil Procedure
Civil Procedure; production of documents and other materials
for inspection and copying
Code of Civil Procedure §2031 (amended).
AB 2059 (Hayes); STATS 1971, Ch 1706
Section 2031 of the Code of Civil Procedure specifies the procedure
regarding a motion for an order to produce and permit the inspection of
any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photo-
graphs, objects or tangible things.
This section is amended to provide that materials subject to a §2031
motion are those which are:
1) not privileged;
2) relevant to the subject matter of the action, or
3) reasonably calculated to discover admissible evidence relating to
any matters within the scope of examination permitted by §2016(b)
of this code; and
4) in the possession, custody, or control of the party against whom
the action is sought.
This section previously provided that materials subject to a §2031
motion were those which were not privileged; in the possession, custody,
or control of the party against whom the order was sought; and which
constitute or contain evidence relating to any of the matters within the
scope of the examination permitted by §2016(b).
See Generally:
1) NVxITN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE, Discovery and Production of Evidence §992
(1966).
Civil Procedure; inverse condemnation
Code of Civil Procedure §1243.1 (new); Health and Safety Code
§33398 (new).
AB 2235 (Sieroty); STATS 1971, Ch 1681
Chapter 1681 adds §1243.1 to the Code of Civil Procedure to pro-
vide that in any case in which a public entity possessing the power of
eminent domain establishes by resolution or ordinance the necessity to
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acquire a particular parcel or parcels of real property by eminent do-
main, and such public entity does not thereafter initiate, within six
months, an action in eminent domain to take such parcel, the owner of
the parcel may bring an action in inverse condemnation requiring the
taking of such parcel and a determination of the fair market value pay-
able as just compensation for such taking.
In such inverse condemnation action, the court may, in addition,
or in the alternative, if it finds that the rights of the owner have been
interfered with, award damages for any such interference by the public
entity.
This section does not affect a public entity's authority to do any of
the following:
1) Institute a condemnation action.
2) Take immediate possession of the particular parcel of property
sought to be condemned.
3) Rescind a resolution or ordinance which established the neces-
sity to acquire a particular parcel of real property and abandon the
condemnation action.
Chapter 1681, also adds §33398 to the Health and Safety Code to
state that Code of Civil Procedure §1243.1 does not apply to any reso-
lution or ordinance adopting, approving, amending, or approving the
amendment of a redevelopment project or plan. Section 1243.1, how-
ever, will apply to a resolution adopted by a redevelopment agency de-
claring the public necessity for, and authorizing the condemnation of,
and expressly authorizing the filing of a condemnation action as to a
particular parcel or parcels of real property.
Civil Procedure; filing of an answer upon overruling
of a demurrer
Code of Civil Procedure 1069.1 (new); §§472a, 1089, 1090, 1091,
1094 (amended).
SB 649 (Lagomarsino); STATS 1971, Ch 1475
Section 472a of the Code of Civil Procedure is amended to provide
that, except as otherwise provided by a rule adopted by the Judicial
Council, when a demurrer to a complaint or cross-complaint is over-
ruled, and there is no answer filed or entered, the court shall (rather
than may) allow an answer to be filed or entered upon such items as
may be just.
Section 1089, relating to writs of mandate, is amended to provide
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that a party upon whom an alternative writ of mandate or notice of an
application for such a writ has been served, may make a return by de-
murrer, verified answer, or both. If the return is by demurrer alone,
the court may allow an answer to be filed within such time as it may
designate.
Section 1069.1 is added to the Code of Civil Procedure to specify
that the above provisions of §1089, relating to a return by demurrer
or answer, also apply to a writ of review.
Sections 1090, 1091 and 1094 (re: writs of mandate) are amended
by substituting the word "return" for "answer".
COMMENT
The apparent intent of the Legislature in enacting Chapter 1475
was to remove the discretionary authority of courts in civil actions to
deny a party the right to file an answer where his demurrer has been
overruled. It may be noted that this discretion was seldom, if ever, ex-
ercised by the courts. Chapter 1475 retains the discretionary authority
of courts to deny a party the right to file an answer where a demurrer
has been overruled in a trial court writ proceeding. [SB 649 was spon-
sored by the California State Bar]
Civil Procedure; wage garnishment
Code of Civil Procedure § §682.3 (new); 682, 683, 690.6 (amended).
AB 3057 (Cullen); STATS 1971, Ch 1684
Provides specific procedures for garnishment of wages for a
period not to exceed 90 days.
Section 682.3 is added to the Code of Civil Procedure to permit a
judgment creditor to obtain a writ of execution to compel the em-
ployer of a judgment debtor to withold the amount specified (non-ex-
empt earnings) from the judgment debtor's earnings and to pay such
amount withheld to the law officer who served the writ each time it
is withheld. Such withholding is to continue until one of the following
events occurs:
1) A release is given by the levying officer upon written direction
of the judgment creditor, upon court order, or in all other cases pro-
vided by law.
2) The employer has withheld the full amount specified in the
writ of execution from the judgment debtor's earnings.
3) The judgment debtor's employment is terminated by resigna-
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tion or dismissal after service of the execution and he is not reinstated
or reemployed within a period of 90 days after such termination.
4) A period of 90 days has passed from the time the employer was
served with the writ of execution.
Section 682.3 further provides that a judgment debtor may after levy
of his earnings proceed to claim a full exemption of his earnings in ac-
cordance with §§690.6 and 690.50 of the Code of Civil Procedure
within 10 days of the date of the levy of execution. An exemption so
claimed shall extend to any wages withheld pursuant to the levy of
execution whether or not withheld after the claim of exemption is filed.
Section 682.3 also provides for return on collection of the writ of
execution to the court by the law officer who serves it and directs the
law officer to pay all sums, collected under the writ (less lawful fees
and expenses) at least once every 30 days to the person entitled thereto.
Section 682 of the Code of Civil Procedure is amended to provide
that a writ of execution against a judgment debtor's earnings shall be
made in accordance with §682.3 (discussed supra). Prior to this
amendment, a levy against the judgment debtor's earnings was limited
(in §682) to one-half the amount of his earnings and for a time period
of 30 days.
Section 683, which provides for return of the writ of execution to
the court, is amended to reflect that the return of a writ of execution
against the earnings of a judgment debtor is to be made pursuant to
the provisions of § 682.3.
Chapter 1684 also made provisions for amending Code of Civil Pro-
cedure §690.6 if AB 3057 was chaptered after AB 2172, (AB 3057
was chaptered after AB 2172). Section 690.6 of the Code of Civil
Procedure as amended, provides that, "except as provided in §11489
of the Welfare and Institutions Code", all earnings of the debtor re-
ceived for his personal services shall be exempt from levy of attachment
without filing a claim for exemption. Also, one-half (or such greater
portion as is allowed by statute of the United States) of his earnings for
services rendered at any time within the 30 days next preceding the date
of withholding by the employer under §682.3, shall be exempt from
execution. Subdivision (c) of §690.6 further exempts all earnings
received for personal services rendered at any time within 30 days next
preceding the levy of execution, if the earnings are necessary for the use
of the debtor's family residing in this state and supported in whole or in
part by the debtor unless the debt was incurred for the common neces-
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sities of life or incurred for personal services of an employee or former
employee.
See Generally:
1) 3 WNrrIN, CALiFoRNu PNocaau, Enforcement of Judgment §20 (Supp. 1967).
Civil Procedure; offers to settle
Code of Civil Procedure § §998 (new); 997, 998 (repealed).
AB 1814 (Hayes); STATs 1971, Ch 1679
Revises rules pertaining to offers for compromise settlement.
Chapter 1679 provides that not less than 10 days prior to commence-
ment of the trial, any party may serve an offer in writing upon any
other party to the action for a compromise settlement. If the settle-
ment is accepted, judgment shall be entered accordingly. If the offer
is not accepted (acceptance must occur before trial or within 30 days
after the offer is made, whichever occurs first), it may not be en-
tered as evidence upon the trial.
If an offer made by the defendant is not accepted by the plaintiff,
and if the plaintiff receives a judgment less favorable than the terms of
the offer, the plaintiff must pay the defendant's costs from the time of
the offer, the plaintiff may not recover his own costs, and, in any action
other than an eminent domain action, the court may require the plain-
tiff to pay the defendant's costs from the date of filing of the complaint
and costs of expert witnesses (other than regular employees of any
party to the action).
If an offer made by the plaintiff is not accepted by the defendant, and
if the defendant receives a judgment less favorable than the terms of
the offer, the court may require the defendant to pay the plaintiff's
costs of expert witnesses (other than regular employees of any party to
the action) in addition to plaintiff's costs.
Police officers are deemed expert witnesses for the purposes of this
chapter.
Prior to the enactment of this chapter, §997 permitted a defendant
to make an offer for a compromise settlement at any time prior to
trial or judgment and §997 did not expressly require the offer to be in
writing. [AB 1814 was sponsored by the California State Bar]
See Generally:
1) 2 WrrnrN, CALiFoRNmA PROCEmURE, Proceedings Without Trial §17 (Supp. 1967).
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Civil Procedure; mandatory settlement conferences
Code of Civil Procedure § §576.5, 999 (new).
SB 820 (Deukmejian); STATS 1971, Ch 1150
(Effective January 1, 1972)
Requires settlement conference in specified cases involving a
motor vehicle in Los Angeles County; provides a penalty of 7
percent interest if a party rejects a settlement offer and fails to ob-
tain a more favorable judgment.
Section 576.5 is added to the Code of Civil Procedure to provide that
in any action for damages for personal injury, death, or property loss
arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle
which is filed in any court in a county whose population exceeds
6,000,000, a settlement conference shall be held not later than 60 days
after the filing of the "at issue memorandum," unless for good cause
shown, the court on its own motion or the motion of any party grants
an extension of time.
Section 999 is added to the Code of Civil Procedure to provide that
in any action governed by §576.5, each party shall serve an offer in
writing upon each adverse party in the action to allow judgment to be
taken in accordance with the terms and conditions stated in the offer.
The offer shall be served not later than the settlement conference, un-
less for good cause shown, the court permits the offer to be served at a
later time.
If an offer is accepted, the offer and proof of acceptance shall be
filed and judgment entered accordingly. If the offer is not accepted
within 30 days after it has been served, it shall be deemed withdrawn
and shall not be admissible in evidence at the trial.
When defendant's offer is not accepted and plaintiff fails to obtain
a more favorable judgment, the defendant shall be entitled to recover
interest, at the rate of 7 percent per annum from the date defendant's
offer was served, on the difference between plaintiff's offer and the
amount of the judgment.
When plaintiff's offer is not accepted and defendant fails to obtain a
more favorable judgment, plaintiff shall be entitled to recover interest,
at the rate of 7 percent per annum from the date plaintiff's offer was
served, on the amount of the judgment.
Unless specifically designated as such by the party serving the offer,
an offer made pursuant to this section shall not be deemed to be an of-
fer for the purposes of §§997 or 998, and the interest recoverable un-
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der this section shall be in addition to any other amount recoverable un-
der any other provisions of law.
Chapter 1150 applies to any action filed on or after January 1, 1971;
becomes operative on January 1, 1972; shall remain in effect only until
December 31, 1973; and as of that date §§576.5 and 999 are repealed.
COMMENT
The intent of the Legislature in enacting Chapter 1150 was appar-
ently to reduce court congestion and delay in Los Angeles County by
providing an inducement for pre-trial settlement of civil actions based
on injuries arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a mo-
tor vehicle.
The formula for award of interest seems to discriminate against de-
fense offers, because if the plaintiff succeeds, his interest applies to
the entire judgment, whereas the interest to the defendant is limited to
the difference between plaintiff's offer and the judgment. On the other
hand, under this formula if the plaintiff demands $5,000 (as an ex-
ample) and refuses to accept the defendant's offer, regardless of the
amount of that offer, if the verdict is for the defense; (that is, no lia-
bility) it appears that in addition to collecting nothing, the plaintiff
must pay the defendant 7 percent on the $5,000.
This bill also raises an interesting constitutional law question. If
a fundamental right to a day in court could be established, along with
a consequent "chill" on that right caused by the penalty provision, the
classification involving only cases filed in Los Angeles County might be
required to meet the compelling state interest test of Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). With respect to a party's right to a
day in court, there is a possible analogy to recent U.S. District Court
challenges to no-fault automobile insurance.
Without a fundamental right to a day in court, it may be noted that
the Supreme Court has generally upheld classifications in socio-eco-
nomic legislation unless the classification is not rationally related to a
legitimate state interest, or inherently suspect. [Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471 (1970)].
There is some doubt that Chapter 1150 will be effective in achiev-
ing its desired result in that the penalty aspects might cause parties to
delay in filing to avoid operation of the statute, or to file in another
county.
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Civil Procedure; stop notices
Civil Code §§3172, 3210 (amended).
AB 1566 (Johnson); STATS 1971, Ch 1538
Section 3172 of the Civil Code, relating to stop notices for private
works of improvement, is amended to provide that an action against the
owner or construction lender, to enforce payment of the claim stated in
the stop notice or bonded stop notice, may be commenced at any time
after 10 days from the date of service of the stop notice upon either the
owner or construction lender. Such actions shall be commenced not
later than 90 days following the expiration of the period within which
claims of lien must be recorded as prescribed in Chapter 2 (commenc-
ing with §3109); provided however, that no such action shall be
brought to trial, or judgment entered, until the expiration of said 90
day period.
Section 3210 relating to stop notices for public works, is similarly
amended to provide that an action against the original contractor and
the public entity may be commenced at any time after 10 days from the
date of service of the stop notice upon the public entity, and shall be
commenced not later than 90 days following the expiration of the pe-
riod within which stop notices must be filed as provided in §3184. No
such action shall be brought to trial, or judgment entered, until the ex-
piration of said 90 day period.
Prior to amendment, §3172 prohibited commencement of an ac-
tion on a stop notice until expiration of the period within which claims
of lien were to be recorded, and §3210 prohibited commencement prior
to the period within which stop notices were to be filed. As amended,
these sections allow the claimant to commence an action 10 days after
service of the stop notice.
COMMENT
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 1538, these critical times were
often very difficult to determine. The intent of the legislature in adopt-
ing this measure was apparently to eliminate this uncertainty in meas-
uring when to commence the suit, and also to alleviate the problem of
premature suits to enforce stop notices. [AB 1566 was sponsored by the
California State Bar]
See Generally:
1) Bohannan Bros., Inc. v. Lo Jean Development Co., 3 Cal. App. 3d 200 (1969).
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Civil Procedure; travel expenses for witnesses
Government Code §68092.5 (amended).
AB 867 (Warren); STATs 1971, Ch 1126
Subdivision (a) of §68092.5 of the Government Code provides for
compensation for an expert witness who is required to travel to any
court or tribunal to testify. Chapter 1126 amends this section by add-
ing subdivision (b) which provides that in the event the proceeding is
continued or canceled, the witness shall be notifed by the party requir-
ing his attendance by the "quickest and most reliable means of giving
notice under the circumstances." If the party fails to give notice as
required by this subdivision, the witness shall be entitled to receive the
compensation he is entitled to under subdivision (a) notwithstanding
his failure to testify.
The provision which says that an express contract between the party
and the witness shall prevail over this section is retained as subdivision
(c) of the section.
See Generally:
1) 3 WIT-N, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Judgment §30 (1954), (Supp. 1967).
Civil Procedure; dismissal of actions
Code of Civil Procedure §581a (amended).
SB 96 (Moscone); STATs 1971, Ch 7
Provides for dismissal of civil actions for failure of the plaintiff
to prosecute to judgment.
Chapter 7 clarifies Section 581a (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
That section now provides that all actions shall be dismissed on the mo-
tion of the court in which such actions are pending, or on the motion of
any interested party, if no answer has been filed after either service
has been made or the defendant has made a general appearance, and the
plaintiff fails, or has failed, to have judgment entered within three years
after service or appearance by the defendant (if the parties have not
stipulated in writing that such time limit is extended).
This chapter is deemed by the Legislature to be declaratory of the
existing law (Section 3 of SB 96 CAL. STATS. 1971, c. 7).
COMMENT
Prior to the clarification provided by the enactment of this chapter,
Section 581a (c) provided that dismissal could occur if "service has
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been made and no answer has been filed or if the defendant has made
a general appearance in the action," and the plaintiff fails, or has failed,
to attain judgment within three years of service or appearance. If
was argued by some practitioners that since the term general ap-
pearance includes an answer [WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Juris-
diction §118 (2d ed. 1970)], filing an answer would constitute a gen-
eral appearance within the meaning of Section 581a (c). They
then further argued that by construction, a dismissal could be sought
under Section 581a (c) after the specified time period in cases where a
defendant had filed an answer, without regard to the wording "if serv-
ice has been made and no answer has been filed." Some courts agreed
with the above line of reasoning and granted dismissal pursuant to Sec-
tion 581a (c) in cases where service was made and the defendant had
filed an answer by construing the answer as being a general appearance.
This was not the intent of the Legislature when it amended Section 581 a
(c) in 1970, according to a statement read into the Senate Journal on
January 11, 1971, by Senator Moscone, the author of the amendment
passed in the 1970 Session. [JOURNAL OF TIE CALIFORNIA SENATE
77 (1971)]. This chapter appears to eliminate such interpretation
because the language now requires as a prerequisite to seeking dis-
missal pursuant to Section 581a (c), that no answer be filed. [SB 96
was sponsored by the California State Bar]
Civil Procedure; return of service
Code of Civil Procedure §417.30 (amended).
SB 785 (Grunsky) ; STATS 1971, Ch 1366
Section 417.30 of the Code of Civil Procedure is amended to pro-
vide that after a summons has been served on a person, the summons
must be returned together with proof of service as provided in § §417.10
or 417.20, unless the defendant has previously made a general appear-
ance.
Section 417.30 retains unchanged provisions for summons lost after
service, but before return, whereby an affidavit of the person who made
the service showing the time, place, and manner of service and facts
showing that such service was made in accordance with provisions of this
code may be returned with the same effect as if the summons itself were
returned. [Sponsored by the California State Bar]
See Generally:
1) REVIEW OF SELECTED 1969 CODE LEGISLATION, CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE
BAR 67.
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Civil Procedure; unlawful detainer
Code of Civil Procedure §§1167.3, 1167.5 (new); §1167 (amended).
AB 991 (McAlister); STATS 1971, Ch 1127
AB 2461 (Hayes); STATS 1971, Ch 1332
SB 1073 (Deukmejian); STATS 1971, Ch 849
Section 1167 of the Code of Civil Procedure is amended to increase
the time limit for a defendant to respond to the complaint in a forci-
ble entry or unlawful detainer action from three to five days.
Code of Civil Procedure §1167.3 is added to provide that unless
otherwise ordered by the court for good cause, the time allowed the
defendant to answer the complaint or amend the answer shall not ex-
ceed five days under any of the following subdivisions of §586:
2) Demurrer overruled; motion to strike denied;
3) Motion to strike granted, no demurrer sustained or pending;
4) Motion to quash service of summons, stay, dismiss, or writ of
mandate denied;
5) Demurrer to the answer sustained;
6) Motion to transfer denied.
Prior to the enactment of § 1167.3, the time limit to file an answer or
amended answer in the above situations was within the discretion of
the court.
Section 1167.4 is added to the Code of Civil Procedure to provide
that in unlawful detainer and forcible entry actions, where the defend-
ant files a notice of motion pursuant to §418.10 (motion to quash serv-
ice of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or to say or dis-
miss the action on the ground of inconvenient forum), the hearing on
the motion shall be not less than three days nor more than seven days
after the filing of the notice.
The service and filing of such a notice of motion shall extend the
defendant's time to plead until five days after service upon him of the
written notice of entry of an order denying his motion. However, for
good cause shown the court may extend the defendant's time to plead
for an additional period not exceeding 15 days.
Prior to this amendment, the hearing on the motion was not less than
10 days nor more than 20 days after filing the notice. The previous
time extension for pleading was 15 days, or if good cause was shown,
20 days (Code of Civil Procedure §418.10b).
Section 1167.5 is added to the Code of Civil Procedure to provide
that unless otherwise ordered by the court for good cause, no extension
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of time allowed in a forcible entry or unlawful detainer action for the
causes specified in §1054 (prepare pleadings or undertakings, justify
sureties, prepare or amend bills of exception, serve notices other than
for appeal or new trial) shall exceed 10 days without the consent of the
adverse party.
Section 1167.5 reduces the extension of time permitted to perform
the specified acts from a maximum of 30 days to 10 days (See §1054).
[AB 991 was sponsored by the California State Bar]
Civil Procedure; process servers
Business and Professions Code §§22350 et seq. (new); Code of Civil
Procedure § §413.40, 417.40 (new).
AB 2809 (McAlister); STATS 1971, Ch 1661
(Effective July 1, 1972)
Chapter 1661 is added to Division 8 of the Business and Professions
Code for the purpose of regulating process servers. With the excep-
tions of: sheriffs, marshals, constables, or government employees act-
ing in the course of their employment, attorneys and their employees,
persons appointed by the court to serve its process, employees of one
registered under this chapter, licensed private investigators, and those
who serve process without fee on behalf of nonprofit or fraternal or-
ganizations, all persons who make more than 10 services of process in
any given calendar year must register with the clerk of the county in
which he resides or has his principal place of business (§22350).
The certificate of registration shall include: the name, age, address,
and telephone number of the registrant and that he has been a resident
of the state for a period of one year immediately prior to the filing of
registration, and a statement that the registrant will perform his duties
consistent with the laws of service of process in this state (§22351).
The registration must be accompanied by a fee of $100.00 (§22352)
and a security bond of $2000.00 (§22353). The registration is valid
for 2 years (§22354).
Any person who recovers damages for injury caused by a service of
process which did not comply with the provisions of law governing such
service is entitled to recover his damages from the bond (§22357).
Procedures for investigation, revocation and suspension of the regis-
tration are provided by §22358. A violation of the provisions of this
chapter is a misdemeanor (§22359).
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This act becomes operative on July 1, 1972. Any service of process
that complies with the requirement of service of process (Code of Civil
Procedure §§413.10-417.40) shall not be made invalid because it was
made by a person in violation of this chapter (§413.40). Any proof
of service signed by a person under this chapter must indicate the
county in which he is registered (§417.40).
Civil Procedure; writ of attachment on personal property
Code of Civil Procedure §542b (amended).
AB 2058 (Hayes); STATS 1971, Ch 1359
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 1359, Section 542b of the Code
of Civil Procedure provided that an attachment or garnishment on per-
sonal property would cease to be of any force or effect at the expiration
of three years after the issuance of the writ of attachment.
This section is amended to provide that upon motion of a party to the
action, the court in which the action is pending may, by order filed prior
to the expiration of the three year period and for good cause, extend the
time of such attachment or garnishment for a period not exceeding one
year from the date on which the original attachment or garnishment
would expire.
The motion of a party for such an extension must be made not less
than 10 nor more than 60 days before the expiration of the three year
period, and upon notice of not less than 5 days to the party whose pro-
perty is attached or garnished.
The attachment or garnishment may be extended from time to time
in the manner prescribed above, provided that the aggregate period or
periods of such extensions shall not exceed two years.
COMMENT
Present law provides plaintiff a similar means of preserving his at-
tachment where real property is involved (Code of Civil Procedure
§542a). The intent of the Legislature in adopting this provision with
respect to personal property apparently arises from the backlog of cases
in congested courts which may result in a situation where an attachment
made at or about the time of filing ceases to be of any force or effect
before a plaintiff can obtain a trial date.
It should be noted that use of the writ of attachment may have been
severely limited by Randone v. Appellate Department, 5 Cal. 3d 536
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(1971). [See the article on attachment in California, this volume].
[AB 2058 was sponsored by the California State Bar]
See Generally:
1) 1 WIThIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Provisional Remedies §10 (1954), Supp.
1967).
Civil Procedure; jury instructions
Code of Civil Procedure §612.5 (new).
AB 2807 (McAlister); STATS 1971, Ch 1571
Chapter 1571 adds §612.5 to the Code of Civil Procedure to provide
that upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with them a copy
of the written instructions given.
Subdivision 2 of §612.5 further provides that this act shall remain
in effect until December 31, 1974, and as of that date it shall be re-
pealed.
Existing law, §612 of the Code of Civil Procedure, continues to pro-
vides that upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with them
all papers, evidence and exhibits other than depositions, that the court
deems proper.
See Generally:
1) 2 WITKJN, CALIFORmA PROCEDURE, Trial §72 (1954), (Supp. 1967).
2) Leavitt, Taking Materials Into the Deliberation Room, 13 HASTINGS L.J. 415,
420 (1962).
3) Cunningham, Should Instructions Go Into the Jury Room?, 33 CALIF. S.B.J. 278
(1958).
Civil Procedure; cases given precedence
Code of Civil Procedure §35 (new).
AB 1635 (Waxman); STATS 1971, Ch 980
Section 35 is added to the Code of Civil Procedure to provide that
proceedings in cases involving voter registration, candidate certifica-
tion, the certification of ballot measures, and election contests shall be
placed on the calendar in the order of their date of filing and shall be
given precedence.
See Generally:
1) 4 WrrxN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Trial §§46, 47 (2d ed. 1971).
Civil Procedure; judicial review of administrative adjudication
Government Code § 11523 (amended).
AB 2067 (Miller); STATS 1971, Ch 984
Chapter 984 amends Government Code §11523 which pertains to
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the time within which to file a petition for a writ of mandate of ad-
ministrative agency adjudications. Where petitioner, within 10 days af-
ter the last day on which reconsideration by the agency can be ordered
(See Government Code §11521 re: Reconsideration), requests the
agency to prepare all or any parts of the record of the administrative
proceeding, the time within which a petition for judicial review may be
filed shall be extended until 30 days after a copy of such requested rec-
ord is delivered to him. Formerly §11523 permitted only a 5 day ex-
tention of the time for filing.
See Generally:
1) 3 WrrKN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Extraordinary Writs §17(b) (1954).
Civil Procedure; jurisdiction of municipal courts
Code of Civil Procedure §89 (amended).
SB 599 (Beilenson); STATS 1971, Ch 1022
Section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which specifies the juris-
diction of municipal courts, is amended to provide that in any action
that is otherwise within its jurisdiction, the court may impose liability
whether the theory upon which liability is sought to be imposed involves
legal or equitable principles.
COMMENT
As expressed in SB 599, the intent of the Legislature is to clarify and
restate the law relating to the jurisdiction of municipal courts in light
of uncertainty in the law as evidenced by certain language in Castellini
v. Municipal Court, 7 Cal. App. 3d 174 (1970).
In that case the court held: "No sound policy reason occurs to us
why in a case otherwise within municipal court jurisdiction, equitable
principles should not be generally applicable. Such a rule would tend
to obviate the frequent and understandable misapprehension of litigants
as to just where jurisdiction lies. It would prevent time consuming de-
lays, such as here, which must at times result in a denial of justice.
But the state Constitution, Article VI, Section 5, casts the power to
make such a determination on the Legislature, not in the courts." [SB
599 was sponsored by the California State Bar]
See Generally:
1) 1 WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Courts §71 (1970).
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Civil Procedure; service of process to, and subpoena of, records
of the Department of Motor Vehicles
Vehicle Code §24.5 (new).
SB 484 (Lagomarsino); STATs 1971, Ch 699
Section 24.5 of the Vehicle Code requires service of all civil process
in actions against the Director of the Department of Motor Vehicles or
against the Department of Motor Vehicles, and service of subpoenas
for records of the Department of Motor Vehicles be made upon the di-
rector or his appointed representative at the department headquarters
in Sacramento. Prior to the enactment of this chapter such service was
not specifically required to be made at the headquarters in Sacramento.
Civil Procedure; appointment of guardian ad litem
Code of Civil Procedure §373 (amended).
SB 906 (Cologne); STATS 1971, Ch 755
The word "minor" is substituted for the word "infant" in Section 373
of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to the method and time for ap-
pointing a guardian ad litem.
This amendment is a non-substantive change designed to make the
section consistent with Code of Civil Procedure Section 372 which pro-
vides that when a minor is a party in a civil action he must appear ei-
ther by a guardian of the estate or by a guardian ad litem, and Civil
Code Section 42 which provides that a minor may enforce his rights by
civil action in the same manner as a person of full age, except that a
guardian must conduct the proceedings.
See Generally:
1) 3 Wn=, CALiFOmu'I PROCEDURE, Pleading §§53, 56 (1971).
Civil Procedure; injunctions against building contractors
Business and Professions Code §7028.4 (amended).
AB 678 (Townsend); STATS 1971, Ch 442
Chapter 442 includes associations of contractors within the classes of
persons who may petition for an injunction to prevent any person with-
out a valid license from acting as a contractor.
Prior to the enactment of this chapter, associations of contractors
were not included in that class of persons. Other persons permitted
such action are licensed contractors, consumers affected by a violation
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of the contractor licensing provision, district attorneys and the Attor-
ney General.
Civil Procedure; small claims court
Code of Civil Procedure § 117 (amended).
AB 1142 (Brathwaite); STATS 1971, Ch 572
AB 1142 amends C.C.P. §117 to increase the monetary jurisdiction
of the small claims court to $500. Prior to amendment, § 117 provided
that, to be within the jurisdiction of the small claims court, a claim
could not be in excess of $300. [AB 1142 was sponsored by the Cali-
fornia State Bar]
See Generally:
1) 1 WrriN, CAUFORNIA PROCEDURE, Courts §102 (1954).
Civil Procedure; recording, grantor-grantee index
Government Code §§27257, 27563 (amended); 27258-27262 (re-
pealed).
AB 245 (Meade); STATS 1971, Ch 191
This chapter permits the recorder to utilize either of two record sys-
tems. He may use a system which has a general index of grantors and
a general index of grantees or he may use a system which combines
such indices into a single, alphabetized grantor-grantee index
(§27257). Regardless of which system is used, the information re-
quired to be included in the records is the names of the grantors, grant-
ees, plaintiffs, defendants, first parties, second parties, and any sheriff,
marshal, or constable who executes a conveyance of real property
and any executor, administrator, or trustee of an estate (§§27257,
27263). If a single index is used, the recorder is required to dis-
tinguish the parties as either grantor or grantee by an easily recogniz-
able mark or symbol (§27257).
Prior to passage of this chapter, the recorder was permitted to keep
independent indices for each of the following: deeds, mortgages, offi-
cial bonds, mechanic's liens, transcripts of judgments, attachments, no-
tices of pendency of action, separate property of married woman, vital
statistics and mining locations (§§27231-27256). Passage of this
chapter permits the recorder to utilize either of the above discussed
systems in lieu of keeping such independent indices (§27257).
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See Generally:
1) 2 WITHIN, SUMMARY OF CAIFOpNIA LAw, Real Property §§67, 68 (7th ed. 1960).
2) CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, California Real Estate Sales Transactions
§§18.1, 18.43, 18.74, 18.75 (1967).
Civil Procedure; environmental actions
Code of Civil Procedure §§ 389.6, 641.2 (new); Government Code
§ § 12600-12612 (new).
SB 678 (Lagomarsino); STATS 1971, Ch 1518
Requires any party filing a pleading which raises environmental
issues to furnish a copy to the Attorney General; specifies the
function and role of the Attorney General in environmental law-
suits; establishes an affirmative defense in such actions.
Section 389.6 is added to the Code of Civil Procedure to provide that
in any action brought by any party for relief of any nature, other than
solely for money damages, where a pleading alleges facts or issues con-
cerning alleged pollution or adverse environmental effects which could
affect the public generally, the party filing the pleading shall furnish a
copy to the Attorney General of the State of California. Such copy shall
be furnished by the party filing the pleading within 10 days after filing.
Chapter 1518 also adds Article 8 (§§12600-12612) to the Govern-
ment Code which relates to the function and role of the Attorney
General in environmental lawsuits.
Sections 12600-12605 set forth the legislative findings with respect
to the policy of this state to protect its environment; the technical pro-
visions of the article relating to the nonexclusiveness of the remedies, the
preservation of the remainder of the bill in the event a particular ele-
ment is held unconstitutional, the liberal construction of the working
provisions to promote the underlying purposes; and applicable defini-
tions of terms.
Section 12606 enables the Attorney General to intervene in any ju-
dicial or administrative proceeding in which facts are alleged concern-
ing pollution or adverse environmental effects which could affect the
public generally, and Section 12607 enables the Attorney General to
maintain an action for equitable relief for the protection of the natural
resources of the state from pollution, impairment or destruction.
In such an action for equitable relief, under the provisions of Sec-
tion 12608, the defendant may show by way of affirmative defense that
there is no more feasible and prudent alternative to the defendant's con-
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duct, and that such conduct is consistent with the protection of the
public health, safety, and welfare.
A limitation of 180 days after which the Attorney General may not
challenge a zoininz decision of an administrative or legislative body is
provided in Section 12609.
In granting temporary and permanent equitable relief, section 12610
allows the court to impose such conditions upon the defendant as may
be required to protect the natural resources of the state from pollution,
impairment or destruction.
If administrative proceedings are pending or available to determine
the legality of a defendant's conduct, product, or program, Section
12611 requires the court to stay an action brought by the Attorney
General pending the completion of such proceedings, unless such a stay
would result in irreparable harm to natural resources.
In any event, the court may grant temporary equitable relief in the
order staying such proceedings where appropriate to prevent irreparable
pollution, impairment or destruction of any natural resource.
Section 12612 provides that the Attorney General shall be permitted
to intervene in any administrative, licensing, or other such proceeding,
or in any judicial review thereof which is made available by law, upon
showing that the proceeding involves conduct, programs, or products
which may have the effect of impairing, polluting, or destroying the
natural resources of the state.
In any such proceeding described above, in which the Attorney Gen-
eral is a party, the agency or court shall consider the alleged impair-
ment, pollution or destruction of the natural resources of the state,
and no conduct, program, or product shall be authorized or approved
which does, or will have such effect unless it is consistent with the pro-
tection of the public health, safety, or welfare.
In any judicial review under Section 12612, the evidence before the
court shall consist of the record before the agency and any other rele-
vant evidence which, in the judgment of the court, should be considered
to effectuate and implement the policies of the article.
Section 641.2 was added to the Code of Civil Procedure by Chapter
1518 and provides that in any action brought under the above provi-
sions of the Government Code, a party may object to the appointment
of any person as referee on the ground that he is not technically quali-
fied with respect to the particular subject matter of the proceeding.
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Civil Procedure; venue affidavits under the Rees-Levering
and Unruh Acts
Civil Code §§1812.10, 2984.4 (amended).
AB 1059 (Johnson); STATs 1971, Ch 1529
Permits the court to allow filing of venue affidavit by plaintiff
subsequent to filing of complaint; requires service of affidavit on
defendant; specifies that defendant's time to plead shall date
from time of such service; requires attachment affidavit to state
facts showing action was commenced in proper court; makes plain-
tiff liable for attorney's fees if attachment affidavit fails to con-
form with specified requirements.
Section 1812.10 provides that in action under the Retail Credit
Sales Act (§§1801-1812.10), concurrently with the filing of the com-
plaint, plaintiff shall file an affidavit stating facts showing that the ac-
tion has been commenced in a county or judicial district described in
this section as a proper place for trial of the action.
This section is amended to require that when such affidavit is filed
with the complaint, a copy thereof shall be served with the summons.
If a plaintiff fails to file the affidavit or state facts in a verified com-
plaint required by this section, no further proceedings shall be had; but
the court shall, upon its own motion or upon motion of any party, dis-
miss any such action without prejudice.
However, the court may, on such terms as may be just, permit the
affidavit to be filed subsequent to the filing of the complaint and a copy
of such affidavit shall be served on the defendant. The time to answer
or otherwise plead shall date from such service.
Prior to amendment, Section 1812.10 made no provision for filing
the affidavit subsequent to the filing of the complaint.
Section 2984.4 of the Civil Code, relating to actions under the Auto-
mobile Sales Finance Act (§§2981-2984.4), is similarly amended to
require a plaintiff to comply with the same filing requirements as
stated above.
Section 2984.4 is also amended to provide that in any action subject
to the Automobile Sales Finance Act (Rees-Levering), in addition to
the statements required by Section 538 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
an affidavit for a writ of atachment shall state facts showing that the
action has been commenced in a county or judicial district described in
this section as a proper place for the trial of the action.
A plaintiff shall be liable for reasonable attorney's fees proximately
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caused by a levy made pursuant to a writ of attachment issued upon
an affidavit which does not comply with this section.
COMMENT
In 1970, to reflect a legislative concern that creditors might be se-
lecting inconvenient forums to obtain default judgments in marginal
debt cases, the Ress-Levering and Unruh Act venue sections were
amended to require the plaintiff-creditor to show that the place of trial
was proper. By the terms of these 1970 amendments, the court was
compelled to dismiss the action without prejudice if the affidavit was
not filed with the complaint.
Under the provisions of AB 1059, the court may accept late filing of
the venue affidavit "on such terms as may be just." The apparent in-
tent of the legislature in adopting this measure was to reflect a concern
that dismissal of the lawsuit was too drastic a remedy, and to alleviate
a situation where even if circumstances indicated inadvertant error or
good faith mistake, the court's hands were tied. [AB 1059 was spon-
sored by the California State Bar]
See Generally:
1) 1 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Sales §5 (7th ed. 1960); §5B (Supp.
1969).
2) 2 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF SELECTED 1970 CoD LEGISLATION 310 (1971).
Civil Procedure; interrogatories
Code of Civil Procedure §2030 (amended).
AB 2060 (Hayes);STATS 1971, Ch 1643
Chapter 1643 amends §2030 to permit a party to a civil action to
require interrogatories of any other party to the action. Prior to this
enactment, interrogatories were permitted to be taken of adverse par-
ties only.
See Generally:
1) REvIEw OF SELECTED 1968 CODE LEGISLATION, CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE
BAR 107.
Civil Procedure; execution of judgment
Code of Civil Procedure § §692, 700a (amended).
SB 1267 (Beilenson); STATS 1971, Ch 1312
Section 692 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that before the
sale of any real property under a writ of execution, notice must be
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posted at least 20 days prior to the date of the sale in one public place
in the city or judicial district where the property is to be sold, and pub-
lished in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for the same
period.
This section is amended to add a provision that at least 20 days be-
fore the date of sale, notice of the time and place of sale must be mailed
to the judgment debtor at his place of business or residence address last
known to the judgment creditor or his attorney, or such notice must be
delivered to the judgment debtor.
As amended, Section 692 specifies that it shall be the duty of the
party delivering an execution to an officer for levy to furnish the in-
formation required by the levying officer to comply with this provision.
Section 700a of the Code of Civil Procedure is amended to provide
that if property sold pursuant to an execution of judgment is subject
to redemption, the officer shall inform the judgment debtor, by cer-
tified mail or personal service, of his right of redemption. This notice
shall include the following:
1) The time within which redemption is allowed;
2) A description of the property;
3) The amount to be paid in redemption; and
4) The place at which such payment may be made.
Failure to give such notice within one week after the sale shall make
the officer liable to the judgment debtor for actual damages, in addition
to a penalty of one hundred dollars ($100).
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 1312, there was no provision
in the Code of Civil Procedure for personal service on the judgment
debtor of any notice of sale, nor any provision requiring the levying of-
ficer to provide the judgment debtor with notice of the right to redeem
his property.
See Generally:
1) 3 ArrKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Enforcement of Judgment §24 (1954),
(Supp. 1967).
2) 1 WITKIN, SummARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Security Transactions in Real Prop-
erty §§23, 60 (7th ed. 1960).
Civil Procedure; venue
Code of Civil Procedure § §395, 585.5 (amended).
AB 1905 (Warren); STATS 1971, Ch 1640
As amended, §395 specifies that the proper venue for actions based
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 3
24Q
Civil Procedure
upon the defendant's obligation for goods, services, loans, or extensions
of credit intended primarily for personal, household, or family use shall
be:
1) The county in which the defendant signed the contract, or
2) The county in which the defendant resided at the time the con-
tract was signed, or
3) The county of the defendant's residence at the commencement
of the action.
The above provisions do not apply to actions arising pursuant to the
Unruh Act (see Civil Code §1811.10) or the Rees-Levering Motor
Vehicles Sales and Finance Act (see Civil Code §2984.4).
Section 585.5 is amended to require that when the plaintiff applies
for a default judgment, he must submit an affidavit stating facts show-
ing that the action is or is not subject to the venue provisions of §395
of the Code of Civil Procedure or of The Unruh or Rees-Levering Acts
(supra). Furthermore, the defendant now has the opportunity to set
aside a default judgment if there has not been compliance with the
venue provisions. The defendant has 60 days after levy on his property
to make a motion to set aside the default, and such motion must spe-
cify that the defendant asks leave to plead in a court of proper venue.
The defendant must present to the court a copy of the pleading pro-
posed to be filed in the court of proper venue. If these requirements
are met, then the court shall set aside the default.
If the default is set aside, upon finding that the plaintiff did not use
reasonable diligence to file the action in the proper court, the court
may award the defendant actual damages and costs, including reason-
able attorney's fees.
Civil Procedure; counterclaims and cross-complaints, joinder of
causes of action, and related provisions
Civil Code §1692 (amended); Code of Civil Procedure §§117h,
117r, 378, 379, 382, 389, 396, 435, 437c, 581, 583, 626, 631.8,
666, 871.2, 871.3, 871.5, 1048 (amended); §§379a, 379b, 379c,
380, 381, 383, 384, 422, Ch 2 (commencing with §425), Ch 3
(commencing with §430), 431, 431.5, 432, 433, 434, 437, 437a,
437b, 437d, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, Ch 5 (commencing with
§443), 462, 463 (repealed); §§379.5, 422.10, 422.20, 422.30,
422.40, Ch 2 §§ 425.10, 425.20, 426.10, 426.30, 426.40, 426.50,
426.60, 427.10, 428.10, 428.20, 428.30, 428.40, 428.50, 428.60,
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428.70, 428.80, 429.10, 429.20, 429.30, 429.40; Ch 3 §§430.10,
430.20, 430.30, 430.40, 430.50, 430.60, 430.70, 430.80, 431.10,
431.20, 431.30, 431.40, 431.50, 431.60, 431.70, 432.10, 471.5
(new); Revenue and Taxation Code §§3522, 3810 (amended); Wa-
ter Code §§26304, 26305, 37161, 37162, 51696 (amended).
SB 201 (Song); STATS 1971, Ch 244
(Effective date July 1, 1972)
Chapter 244 enacts numerous changes relating to pleading rules in
California. The changes include substantive as well as technical and
non-substantive revisions summarized as follows: permissive joinder
of parties is now governed by the transaction and common question
test used in federal courts; compulsory joinder of parties is limited to
situations in which absence of a person might result in substantial preju-
dice to him or to the parties already before the court; provisions are set
forth for allowable pleadings, pleadings in justice courts, and require-
ments for captions and names of parties in the title of action; the formal
requirements of complaints and cross-complaints have been made con-
sistent; related causes of action must be pleaded in a cross-complaint;
plaintiffs may unite causes of action in a complaint; provision is made
for compulsory cross-complaints and their applicability; a cross-com-
plaint is now the only type of pleading that may be filed to request re-
lief by a party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been
filed; counterclaims have been abolished; procedurally complaints and
cross-complaints are treated the same, and necessary revisions are made
to bring into conformity the various sections relating to objections to
pleadings, denials and defenses.
In order to present the practicing attorney with something more
than a mere summary of what Chapter 244 has done, this treatment of
Chapter 244 will depart from the usual format of the Legislation Re-
view by presenting, in some detail, the interrelated changes that have
resulted in pleading procedures. The California Law Revision Com-
mission Report on the subject has been relied on and cited extensively
throughout this treatment, as well as citation to Witkin and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, where appropriate.
Joinder of Parties
Permissive joinder is now governed by the transaction and
common question test used in Federal Courts. Compulsory join-
der is limited to situations in which absence of a person might re-
sult in substantial prejudice to him or to the parties already be-
fore the court.
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Section 378 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides for the permis-
sive joinder as plaintiffs those plaintiffs who assert any right to relief
jointly, severally, or in the alternative, in respect of or arising out of the
same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences if
any question of law or fact common to all will arise in the action. Per-
missive joinder of plaintiffs also is permitted if all have a claim, right or
interest adverse to the defendant in the property or controversy which
is the subject of the action. Each plaintiff need not be interested as to
every cause of action or as to all relief prayed for; judgment may be
given for one or more of the plaintiffs according to their respective
rights to relief.
Section 378 continues the substance of prior California law on joinder
of plaintiffs. Section 378(a) (1) and §378(b) are phrased in sub-
stantial conformity with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 20(a).
The broadest sort of joinder is permitted under the transaction clause of
the federal rule and of §378 [see CALIFORNIA LAw REVISION COMMIS-
SION, Recommendation and Study Relating to Counterclaims and Cross-
Complaints, Joinder of Causes of Action, and Related Provisions p. 528,
hereinafter cited as Comm'n. Report]. Formerly §378 included an
"interest in the subject of the action" provision. Although it is not
needed to expand the broad scope of permissive joinder under the
"transaction" clause of §378 (a) (1), it has been included in §378
(a) (2) to eliminate any possibility that its omission (or as omitted
by repeal of §§381, 383, and 384, discussed infra) might be construed
to preclude joinder in cases where it was formerly permitted [Comm'n.
Report p. 528].
The power of the court to sever causes where appropriate, formerly
found in §378, is now dealt with separately in §379.5 (discussed in-
fra).
Section 379 is amended to provide statutory standards for joinder of
defendants comparable to those governing joinder of plaintiffs (see
§378 supra). It is arguable that §379 merely makes explicit what was
implicit in Hoag v. Superior Ct., 207 Cal. App. 2d 611 (1962).
The phrase "in the alternative" contained in §379 retains without
change the prior law under former CCP §§379a, and 379c (repealed
-see discussion infra). [See FED. R. Crv. PRoc. Rule 20(a); Kraft
v. Smith, 24 Cal. 2d 124, (1944), but see also Landau v. Salam, 10
Cal. App. 3d 472 (1970). Comm'n. Report p. 529] Former §§379a,
379b, 379c are repealed and superseded by the new §379. Note that
former §379c is repealed as unnecessary because the authority granted
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by §379c to join defendants liable in the alternative is continued with-
out change in revised §379. [Comm'n. Report p. 530].
Section 379.5 providing for the discretion of the court to sever causes
where appropriate, continues without significant change the prior law
by combining former §378 and 379b and making them uniformly ap-
plicable to any party-plaintiff or defendant. [Comm'n. Report pp.
530-531]. The federal counterpart to §379.5 is Rule 20(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The general authority of a court to
sever causes of action and issues for trial is contained in CCP §1048
(discussed infra).
Section 380 (re: action by person out of possession of real prop-
erty) is repealed because it is made unnecessary by the liberal rule of
permissive joinder set forth in §379. Repeal of §380, however, does
not affect the power of the court to issue a writ of possession in the type
of case described in the section; see CCP §§681, and 682(5).
Section 381 (re: joinder as plaintiffs and those claiming under com-
mon source of title to defend) is repealed as unnecessary because its
express statutory authorization of joinder of certain persons as plaintiffs
was eclipsed in 1927 by the revision of §378. [Comm'n. Report p. 531].
Section 382 (re: joinder as defendant one who would not consent to
be joined as plaintiff) is amended to delete the old common law rule
of compulsory joinder because such provisions have been superseded
by §389 (discussed infra). No change has been made in §382 insofar
as it deals with joining an unwilling plaintiff as a defendant and with
representative or class actions. [Comm'n. Report p. 532].
Section 383 (re: joinder of persons severally liable upon same obli-
gation or instrument) is repealed as unnecessary, in part by the liberal
rules of permissive joinder set forth in §§378 and 379 (supra), and in
part superseded by the rules for compulsory joinder set forth in §389
(infra). If compulsory joinder is not required pursuant to §389, noth-
ing prohibits an indeterminate number of such persons from joining or
being joined. [Comm'n. Report p. 533].
Section 384 (re: joinder of persons holding as tenants in common,
joint tenants or coparceners) is repealed for the same reasons set forth
for §383 (supra). See Comm'n. Report pp. 533-544 for further dis-
cussion.
Section 389 (re: compulsory joinder of parties) is amended to sub-
stitute Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 19, almost in its entirety,
for former §389. The words "without prejudice" have been added,
however, to the language of Rule 19 to avoid any contrary implications
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that might conceivably be created by the omission of a similar provi-
sion found in former §389. See Wilson v. Frakes, 178 Cal. App. 2d
580 (1960). The amended version of §389 basically requires joinder
of persons materially interested in any action whenever feasible. How-
ever, note that where joinder would deprive the court of subject matter
jurisdiction it cannot be accomplished. Also where personal jurisdic-
tion over the party cannot be obtained joinder will be impossible.
[Comm'n. Report p. 535].
According to the Comm'n. Report, pp. 535-540, when joinder can-
not be accomplished, the circumstances must be examined and a choice
made between proceeding with or dismissing the action. Factors to be
considered in making the choice include the adequacy of relief that may
be granted in a person's absence and the probability of prejudice to ei-
ther such person or the parties before the court. Note, however, that a
person is regarded as indispensable only in the "conclusionary" sense
that, in his absence, the court has decided the action should be dis-
missed. Where the decision is to proceed, the court has the power to
make a legally binding adjudication between the parties properly be-
fore it.
Section 389, as amended, changes the approach of former §389 by
limiting compulsory joinder to those situations where the absence of
a person may result in substantial prejudice to that person or the par-
ties already before the court [see Comm'n. Report p. 501, 515, 536;
Friedenthal, Joinder of Calims, Counterclaims, and Cross-Complaints:
Suggested Revision of the California Provisions, 23 STAN. L. REv. 1
(1970); Comment, Bringing New Parties Into Civil Actions in Cali-
fornia, 46 CALIF. L. REV. 100 (1958); Comment, Joinder of Parties
in Civil Actions in California, 33 So. CAL. L. REv. 428 (1960)]. Note
that §389 does not apply to class actions.
The Comm'n. Report, p. 536, also points out that under prior law,
an indispensable party had to be joined in the action or the court had
no jurisdiction to proceed with the case [Irwin v. City of Manhattan
Beach, 227 Cal. App. 2d 634 (1964)]. This absolute rule has un-
dergone a change in emphasis and the guidelines provided in §389 are
substantially those the the courts have been following [See Bank of Cali-
fornia v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 2d 516 (1940)]. These guidelines,
according to Comm'n. Report, supra, should require dismissal in the
same circumstances where formerly a person was characterized as in-
dispensable. [3 WITKIN CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Pleading §§3, 132
(2nd ed. 1971); FED. R. Civ. PRoC. 19, 20; C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL
COuRTS §§70, 71 (2d ed. 1970)].
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Allowable Pleadings
Sets forth allowable pleadings; pleadings in justice courts; re-
quirements for captions and names of parties in title of action.
Code of Civil Procedure §422 (re: allowable pleadings) is repealed.
That portion of §422 which enumerated the permissive pleadings is
superseded by §422.10 (discussed infra); the portion which related to
pleadings in justice courts is superseded by §422.20 (discussed infra).
As noted above, §422.10 supersedes in part former §422, but un-
like §422 which specified the pleadings to which a demurrer or answer
could be filed, the new §422.10 lists the pleadings allowed (i.e., com-
plaints, demurrers, answers, and cross-complaints); the circumstances
where a particular pleading is required or permitted are specified in
subsequent sections. [see also CCP §411.10 re: a civil action is com-
menced by filing a complaint with the court]. The complaint and
cross-complaint are the only pleadings that can request affirmative re-
lief; a counterclaim is no longer permitted (see §428.80 discussed in-
fra). [Comm'n. Report p. 542].
Section 422.20 continues without substantive change most of the
provisions of former §422 with respect to justice courts. Note, how-
ever, that §422.20 also contains portions of §426 (now repealed) with
respect to application of the rules in the section to justice courts only
[§422.20(a)], and that "a copy of the account, note, bill, bond or in-
strumental upon which the cause of action is based is a sufficient com-
plaint or cross-complaint" [§ 422.20(d)]. Where the provisions con-
tained in §§422.20(a) and (d) as found in former §426 only applied
to "complaints", they are now expanded to apply to both complaints
and cross-complaints. [Comm'n. Report p. 543].
Section 422.30 retains the substance of the provisions of former §426
which prescribed the caption to be used on a complaint. Note, how-
ever, that unlike former §426, the new §422.30 applies to all plead-
ings rather than just to the complaint. This extension of the caption re-
quirement is consistent with former practice [see CAL. RULES OF COURT,
Rules 201 (c) (superior courts); 501 (c) (municipal courts)]. [Comm'n.
Report p. 543].
Section 422.40 continues the requirement that the complaint include
the names of the parties (as found in portion of former §426), how-
ever, note the addition of the new provision applying to "other plead-
ings." According to Comm'n. Report p. 543, the inclusion of the
phrase "et al." would be "an appropriate indication of other parties" for
the purposes of §422.40. [§422.40 is based, in part, on FED. R. Civ.
PRoc., Rule 10(a)].
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Pleadings Demanding Relief
The formal requirements of complaints and cross-complaints
have been made consistent. Related causes of action must be
pleaded in a cross-complaint. Plaintiffs may unite causes of action
in a complaint.
General Provisions
Code of Civil Procedure §425 (re: First pleading) has been re-
pealed as unnecessary because it duplicates §411.10 (re: Complaint).
Sections 426, 426a, 426c and 427 are also repealed as superseded by
the new provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (as noted where ap-
propriate).
The new §425.10 (re: Content of pleading demanding relief) con-
tinues the requirements found in a portion of former §426 (which re-
lated to the necessary contents of a complaint). Section 425.10 now re-
quires a complaint or cross-complaint to contain both of the following:
1) a statement of the facts constituting the cause of action in ordinary
and concise language; and 2) a demand for judgment for the relief to
which the pleader claims he is entitled. If the recovery of money or
damages be demanded, the amount thereof shall be stated. Note that
where former §426 only applied to complaints, §425.10 now applies
to both complaints and cross-complaints.
Section 425.20 supersedes a portion of former §427 (re: permissible
joinder of causes of action); which is now repealed. The new §425.20
provides that causes of action shall be separately stated, except as other-
wise provided by law. The two exceptions to the rule stated above that
are included in §425.20 are carried over almost verbatim from former
§427 dealing with: an action brought by the husband and wife
[§425.20(b)]; causes of action for injuries to person and injuries to
property growing out of the same tort [§425.20(c)].
Compulsory Cross-Complaints
Provides for compulsory cross-complaints; sets forth the ap-
plicability of compulsory cross-complaints.
Section 426.10, as added to the Code of Civil Procedure, provides a
definition of "complaint" (which means a complaint or cross-com-
plaint); "plaintiff" (which means a person who files a complaint or
cross-complaint); and "related cause of action" (which means a cause
of action which arises out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series
of transactions or occurrences as the cause of action which the plain-
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tiff alleges in his complaint) as they apply to the compulsory cross-
complaints sections. According to Comm'n. Report p. 545, with respect
to the definition of "related cause of action" §426.10 provides a con-
venient means for referring to a cause of action which arises out of the
same transaction or occurrence, and follows prior law (former §439)
which was judicially interpreted to include a series of related acts or
conduct [Brunswig Drug Co. v. Springer, 55 Cal. App. 2d 444 (1942);
Sylvester v. Soulsburg, 252 Cal. App. 2d 185 (1967)].
Section 426.30 (re: compulsory cross-complaints) continues the
substance of the former compulsory counterlcaim rule under §439
(which is repealed). Note, however, that the scope of the former rule
is expanded by §426.30 to include some causes of action that formerly
were not compulsory. Such expansion was necessitated because of the
broadened scope of a cross-complaint which includes claims which
would not have met the "defeat or diminish" or "separate judgment"
requirements of the former counterclaim statute. [see Comm'n. Report
p. 547; Friedenthal, cited supra p. 245, at 17-27; compare Hill v. Sni-
dow, 100 Cal. App. 2d 37 (1950), with Hanes v. Coffee, 212 Cal. 777
(1931)].
Section 426.30 affects only related causes of action that exist at the
time of service of the answer to the complaint on the particular plain-
tiff [§426.30(a)].
A court must grant a party who acted in good faith leave to assert a
related cause of action he failed to allege in a cross-complaint if, prior
to trial, the party applies for leave to assert the cause unless the grant-
ing of such leave will result in substantial injustice to the opposing
party [Comm'n. Report p. 547; see §426.50 discussed infra].
Section 426.30(b) is a new addition to the Code of Civil Procedure
designed to prevent unjust forefeiture of a cause of action. According
to Comm'n. Report p. 547, §426.30(b) (1) deals with the situation
where a party is not subject to a personal judgment, jurisdiction having
been obtained only over property owned by him. In this situation, al-
though the party against whom the complaint or cross-complaint is filed
is not required to plead a related cause of action in a cross-complaint,
he may do so at his election. If he elects to file a cross-complaint, he is
required to assert all related causes of action in his cross-complaint
[§426.30(b) (1) is similar to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule
13(a)(2); §426.10, supra defines complaints to include cross-com-
plaints].
Section 426.30(b) (2) permits a party to default without forefeiting
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any cause of action. According to Comm'n. Report p. 547, if the
party does not desire to defend the action and a default is taken, it
would be unfair if an additional consequence of such default were that
such party could not thereafter in any other action assert against the
plaintiff the related cause of action not pleaded.
Note that, although §426.30 may not apply to a particular case,
independent application of the rules of res judicata or collateral estop-
pel, if any, are not affected. [Comm'n. Report p. 547].
Section 426.40 (a) and (b) (re: exceptions to compulsory joinder
requirement) are designed to prohibit application of the compulsory
joinder requirement to a cause of action which cannot be maintained.
Section 426.40 (a) ("The cause of action not pleaded requires for its
adjudication the presence of additional parties over whom the court
cannot acquire jurisdiction") uses language taken from Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, Rule 13(a). Section 426.40(b) ("Both the court
in which the action is pending and any other court to which the ac-
tion is transferable pursuant to §396 are prohibited by the federal or
state constitution or by a statute from entertaining the cause of action
not pleaded"), according to Comm'n. Report p. 548, is designed to
meet problems that may arise when the federal courts have jurisdiction
to enforce a cause of action created by federal statute. In cases where
the state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction, if the cause of
action created by the federal statute arises out of the same transaction
or occurrence, §426.30 [supra] requires joinder in the state court
proceeding, and §426.40(b) is not applicable. Furthermore, as
pointed out in the Comm'n. Report, in those cases where the federal
courts have exclusive jurisdiction of the federal cause of action
§426.40(b), in recognizing that the federal cause of action is not per-
mitted to be brought in the state court, provides an exception to the
compulsory joinder or compulsory cross-complaint requirements. Sec-
tion 426.40(b) makes clear that inability to assert a federal cause of
action in the state court does not preclude bringing a later action in the
federal court to obtain relief under the federal statute [Comm'n. Re-
port p. 549].
Section 426.40(c) makes clear that the rule regarding pending ac-
tions is the same in substance as Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 13(a) (1), in that at the time the action was commenced, 'the
cause of action not pleaded was the subject of another pending action.
Section 426.50 provides that, with respect to the requirements of
compulsory cross-complaints, a party who fails to plead a cause of ac-
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tion subject to those requirements may apply to the court for leave to
amend his pleading, or to file a cross-complaint, to assert such cause
at any time during the course of the action. If the party who failed
to plead the cause acted in good faith, the court is required to grant
leave to amend the pleading, or to file the cross-complaint to assert
such cause, upon such terms as may be just to the parties. Section
426.50 also contains the provision that it shall be liberally construed
to avoid forfeiture of causes of action. Section 426.50 is similar to
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 13 (f).
Section 426.60 limits the application of compulsory joinder of
causes to ordinary civil actions and does not apply to special proceed-
ings. According to Comm'n. Report p. 550, the statute governing a
particular special proceeding may provide compulsory joinder rules for
that proceeding, and §426.60 has no effect on those rules. Note also,
the fact that this article is not applicable in special proceedings does not
preclude the independent application, if any, of res judicata or collat-
eral estoppel.
Section 426.60(b) excepts actions brought in small claims court
from compulsory joinder requirements. The compulsory joinder rules,
therefore, do not require that a person join a related cause of action
when he brings an action in the small claims court-even where the re-
lated cause is for an amount within the court's jurisdiction [Comm'n.
Report p. 550]. The substance of the rule that the only claim by the de-
defendant that is permitted in the small claims court is one within the
jurisdictional limits of the small claims court is continued in CCP
§ § 1 17h and 1 17r (discussed infra). Note however, that such a claim
is not compulsory under §426.30 (supra). According to the Comm'n.
Report p. 550 this changes prior law under which counterclaims within
the jurisdictional limits of the small claims court apparently were com-
pulsory [see Friedenthal, Civil Procedure, 1969 CAL. LAW-TrENDS
AND DEVELOPMENTS 191, 238-243 (1969) ].
Section 426.60(c) excepts compulsory joinder requirements where
the only relief sought is for declaratory relief [see CCP § 1060].
Permissive Joinder of Causes of Action
Section 427.10 (re: permissive joinder) supersedes former §427
(repealed) and eliminates the arbitrary categories set forth in that sec-
tion. Section 427.10 applies to joinder of causes of action against per-
sons who are properly made parties to the action. Sections 378 and
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379 (discussed supra), and §428.20 (discussed infra) state the rules
governing permissive joinder of parties.
According to Comm'n. Report p. 550-551, under former §427, plain-
tiff could join causes unrelated to one another only when they hap-
pened to fall within one of the stated categories. The broad principle
reflected in §427.10 (complaints) and §§428.10 and 428.20 (cross-
complaints) [discussed infra] is that once a party is properly joined
in an action because of his connection to a single cause of action, ad-
verse parties may join any other causes against him [see Fed. R. Civ.
Proc., Rule 18 (a); Friedenthal cited supra p. 245].
Any undersirable effects that might result from the unlimited joinder
permitted by §427.10 may be avoided by severance of causes or issues
for trial under CCP § 1048 (discussed infra).
Cross-Complaints
A cross-complaint is now the only type of pleading that may
be filed to request relief by a party against whom a complaint or
cross-complaint has been filed; counterclaims have been abol-
ished.
Section 428.10 (re: permissive cross-complaint) provides that a
cross-complaint is the only type of pleading that may be filed to re-
quest relief by a party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has
been filed. Note that if the cause arises out of the same transaction
or occurrence, the cross-complaint is compulsory (see §426.30 supra).
Counterclaims have been abolished by §428.80 (discussed infra).
According to Comm'n. Report pp. 551-552, §428.10(a) adopts the
rule that a party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has
been filed may bring any cause of action he has against the party who
filed the complaint or cross-complaint. A factual relationship between
his cause and the cause of the other party is not required [this rule
coincides with Fed. R. Civ. Proc., Rule 13]. As discussed infra,
third persons may be joined pursuant to §428.20. Section 428.10(a)
is generally consistent with prior law (former §438, repealed) which
provided for a counterclaim; but, under prior law, some causes which
a party had against an opposing party did not qualify as counterclaims
(because they did not satisfy the "diminish or defeat" or "several
judgment" requisites). These requirements are not continued, and
§428.10(a) provides unlimited scope to a cross-complaint against an
opposing party. Note however, that nothing in §428.10(a) authorizes
the filing of a cross-complaint against the plaintiff in an action corn-
Selected 1971 California Legislation
Civil Procedure
menced under § 1237 (eminent domain). [see Friedenthal, cited supra
p. 245, at 19-23].
Section 428.10(b) continues the rule of former §442 (repealed)
that a cross-complaint may be asserted against any person, whether
or not a party to the action, if the cause of action arises out of the same
transaction or occurrence or involves the same property or controversy
(see §§378, 379, 426.10supra).
Section 428.10(b) permits a party to assert a cause of action against
a non-party who is not already a party to the action if the cause has a
subject matter connection with the cause already asserted in the action
[Comm'n. Report p. 552; Friedenthal, cited supra p. 245, at 25-26].
Section 428.10(b) does not limit the right of a party against whom a
cause of action has been asserted to join unrelated causes of action when
filing a cross-complaint under §428.10(a) against the party who as-
serted the cause of action against him. Sections 428.10(a) and (b)
are completely independent provisions, and it is necessary only that
the person seeking to file the cross-complaint come within the provi-
sions of one of the subdivisions [Comm'n. Report p. 552].
Any undersirable effect that might result from joinder of causes un-
der §428.10 may be avoided by severance of causes or issues for trial
under § 1048, infra.
Section 428.20 (re: joinder of parties) retains prior law that a
cross-complaint may be brought against a person or persons not previ-
ously parties to the action if it asserts a cause of action which arises out
of the same transaction or occurrence. Note that there is no require-
ment that the cross-complaint assert a cause of action against a person
already a party to the action (see former §442). Section 428.20 pro-
vides a more liberal rule than prior law where the cause of action as-
serted in the cross-complaint does not arise out of the same transac-
tion or occurrence. Section 428.20 makes clear that, when a cross-
complaint is permitted under §428.10, persons may be joined as cross-
complainants who were not previously parties to the action and the
cross-complaint may be brought against persons who were not previ-
ously parties to the action. Section 428.20, therefore, is consistent with
the general principle that a cross-complaint is to be treated as if it were
a complaint in an independent action [Comm'n. Report p. 553].
Formerly a counterclaim could be brought against a plaintiff only.
The "several judgment" requirement of former CCP §428 precluded
a third person from being joined. This limitation on joinder of parties
is not continued in §428.20 [see Friedenthal, cited supra p. 245, at 21-
23].
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Section 428.30 (re: joinder of causes of action against cross-de-
fendant) provides permissive joinder rules that treat a cross-complaint
the same as a complaint in an independent action. Therefore, accord-
ing to Comm'n. Report p. 553, if a party files a cross-complaint against
either an original party or a stranger or both, he may assert in his cross-
complaint any additional cause of action he has against any of the
cross-defendants (§427.10). Any undersirable effects that might re-
sult from a joinder of causes under §428.30 may be avoided by sev-
erance of causes or issues for trial under §1048 (discussed infra).
Note, however, that both the cross-complaint and the new cross-defend-
ant are subject to the compulsory joinder requirements of §426.30.
Note that §428.30 does not apply to a plaintiff in an eminent domain
proceeding.
Section 428.40 requires the cross-complaint to be a separate docu-
ment. Under prior practice, a counterclaim could be a part of the
answer [Comm'n. Report p. 553]. Note that §428.80 has abolished
the counterclaim.
Section 428.50 (re: cross-complaint filed after answer only with
leave of court) continues a portion of former §442 except, however,
that it makes clear that a cross-complaint may be filed before as well as
at the same time as the answer. [Comm'n. Report p. 554]. As under
former §442, permission of the court is required to file a cross-com-
plaint subsequent to the answer. The Comm'n. Report (supra) states
that the language "may be granted" of §428.50 places the question of
leave to file a cross-complaint after the answer wholly in the discretion
of the court; it is to be distinguished from the mandatory language
"shall . . . be granted" of §426.50 (supra) relating to compulsory
cross-complaints.
Section 428.60 (re: service of cross-complaint) continues without
substantive change requirements that were imposed under former §442.
Section 428.70 (re: rights of "third-party defendants") makes clear
that, in addition to all rights and duties, of a party against whom a
cross-complaint has been filed, a third-party defendant has the right to
assert any defenses which the third-party plaintiff could have asserted
against the party who pleaded the cause of action against the third-
party plaintiff [Comm'n. Report p. 555]. The Comm'n. Report
(supra) also points out that the special answer provided by §428.70,
is designed primarily to meet the problem that arises where a plaintiff
sues a defendant and the defendant cross-complains against a third
party for indemnity. To protect himself from the defendant's failure
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or neglect to assert a proper defense to the plaintiff's action, through
collusion or otherwise, the third-party defendant is allowed to assert
any defenses available to the original defendant directly against the
plaintiff.
Section 428.80 abolishes the counterclaim. Note that §428.10, dis-
cussed supra, provides for a cross-complaint that permits a party to as-
sert any cause of action he formerly could have asserted as a counter-
claim. There is no provision for counterclaims under the revised plead-
ing rules. The Comm'n. Report p. 555, indicates that although con-
forming changes have been made in various codes, sections may be
found that refer to counterclaims [e.g., CoM. CODE §1201(1), (2),
(13)]; §428.80 makes clear that these statutes are to be interpreted
in a manner consistent with the revised pleading provisions and that
the cause of action referred to in these statutes are to be asserted as
cross-complaints, not as counterclaims. Conforming changes with re-
spect to abolition of counterclaims will be discussed infra in section on
Miscellaneous Sections Affected [see Friedenthal, cited p. 245, at 19-23;
3 WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Pleading §§3, 986 (2d ed. 1971)].
Contents of Documents in Particular Actions or Proceedings
Section 429.10 (re: petition in proceeding for dissolution of mar-
riage) continues without substantive change the provisions of former
§426c (re: divorce action; specific facts). Section 429.20 (re: ad-
ditional information required in domestic relations cases) continues
without substantive change the provisions of former §426a (re: di-
vorce, annulment and separate maintenance statistical information).
Section 429.30 (re: action for infringement of rights in literary, artis-
tic, or intellectual production) continues the provisions of portions of
former §426 (re: contents of complaint) but a subdivision has been
added to extend these provisions to cross-complaints. Section 428.40
points out that Title 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure (re: pleadings)
does not apply to the Family Law Act (Civil Code §4000) unless
otherwise provided by Judicial Council (Civil Code §4001 ).
Objections to Pleadings; Denials and Defenses
Procedurally, complaints and cross-complaints are treated the
same and necessary revisions are made to bring into conformity
the various sections relating to objections to pleadings; denials and
defenses.
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Objections to Pleadings
Sections 430, 431, 431.5, and 432 which made up a portion of
former Chapter 3 dealing with the demurrer to the complaint have
been repealed as superseded by the various sections of the new Chap-
ter 3 (discussed infra). It should be noted, however, that §432 (re:
amended complaint; filing; answer) is contniued without change as
§471.5 (discussed infra), except that the time to answer has been in-
creased from 10 to 30 days.
Section 430.10 (re: grounds for objection to complaint or cross-
complaint) continues the grounds for objection to a complaint by de-
murrer (former §430) or answer (former §433), with the following
two changes:
1) Improper joinder of causes of action is no longer a ground for
objection. Any cause of action may be joined against any person who
is properly a party in the action [Comm'n. Report p. 559; see §§427.10,
428.10 and 428.30 (joinder of causes); §§378 and 379 (joinder of
parties)].
2) The separate statement of causes provision has been revised to
conform to §425.20 (discussed supra).
Additionally, §430.10 applies to cross-complaints (which now in-
clude claims that formerly would have been asserted as counterclaims)
while former §430 applied only to a "complaint" [Comm'n. Report p.
559].
Section 430.20 (re: grounds for objections to answer) continues
without substantive change portions of former §444 (re: grounds)
that specified the grounds for objection to the answer; but note that
the grounds for objection to what formerly would have been a counter-
claim are now the same as the grounds for objecting to a complaint
(§430.10). Section 430.20 states that a party against whom an an-
swer has been filed may object to the answer by demurrer as provided
in §430.30 (discussed infra).
Section 430.30 (re: when objections made by demurrer or answer)
continues prior law under various repealed sections of the Code of Civil
Procedure except that former provisions applicable to complaints have
been made applicable to cross-complaints. Section 430.30(a) con-
tinues the rule formerly found in §§430 and 449 (re: demurrer;
grounds; time); §430.30(b) continues the rule formerly found in §433
(re: demurrers; grounds not appearing on face of complaint; objec-
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tion by answer); and §430.30(c) continues the rule formerly found in
§ §431 and 441 (re: demurrers; specific grounds; defenses).
Section 430.40 (re: time to demur) is consistent with the times spe-
cified in former §§430, 442 and 443 [see also §§412.20(a) (3) and
432.10, re: formalities content of summons; time to respond to cross-
complaint].
Section 430.50 (re: demurrer may be taken to all or part of the
complaint) is consistent with prior law but provides specifically that
cross-complaints (including what formerly were counterclaims) are
treated the same as complaints [see former §§431 (complaints), 441
and 443 (answers)].
Section 430.60 (re: statement of grounds for objection) continues
the rule formerly found in §431 except as extended-in accordance
with the former practice-to cover specially cross-complaints and an-
swers.
Section 430.70 (re: judicial notice) continues without change the
provisions of former §431.5 (re: demurrer based on matter of which
court may take judicial notice).
Section 430.80 (re: objection waived by failure to object) is the
same in substance as former §434 (re: failure to object by demurrer
or answer; waiver exceptions) except that §430.80 makes clear that it
applies to objections to cross-complaints. [see generally Comm'n. Re-
port pp. 558-561; objections to pleadings].
Denials and Defenses
Section 431.10 (re: definition of "material allegation") continues
without change the provisions of former §463.
Section 431.20 (re: admission of material allegation by failure to
deny) continues without substantive change the provisions of former
§462 (re: uncontroverted allegations of complaint deemed true; new
matter in answer deemed controverted). Under prior law, according
to the Comm'n. Report p. 561, an answer to a cross-complaint was re-
quired, but no answer to a counterclaim was required. Since cross-
complaints now include what formerly were counterclaims, an answer
to the cross-complaint is now required [see Friedenthal, cited supra p.
245, at 23-24].
Section 431.30 (re: form and content of answer) is substantially
the same as former §437 (re: the answer; necessary contents) except
as expanded to include cross-complaints (§431.20). Note that
§431.30(c) makes clear that affirmative relief may not be claimed in
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the answer. The former counterclaim is abolished. Section 431.30(g)
is the same in substance as portions of former §441 (re: defenses and
counterclaims).
Section 431.40 (re: general denial where amount involved is $500 or
less), §431.50 (re: pleading exemption from liability under insurance
policy), and §431.60 (re: recovery of personal property) continue
the provisions of former §§437(a), (b), and (d) (re: the answer)
except as expanded to include cross-complaints.
Section 431.70 (re: set-off) continues the substantive effect of
former §440 (re: counterclaims; compensated demands; effect of as-
signment or death), however, note that §431.70 is expressly limited
to cross-demands for money and specifies the procedure for pleading
the defense provided by the section. According to Comm'n. Report
p. 564, it is not necessary under §431.71, as it was not necessary under
§440, that the cross-demands be liquidated. Section 431.70 ameli-
orates the effect of the statute of limitations; it does not revive claims
which have been previously forfeited by failure to plead them under
§426.30. This was implied under former §439 in Jones v. Mortimer,
28 Cal. 2d 627 (1946) [see Sunrise Products Co. v. Malovich, 101
Cal. App. 2d 520 (1950); Franck v. J. J. Sugarman-Randolph Co.,
40 Cal. 2d 81 (1952)]. The Comm'n. Report further indicates that
if the defendant defaults without answering, he will not later be barred
from maintaining an action on what would have been a compulsory
counterclaim [see §426.30(b) (2) ]. Though the statute of limitations
may run on such a claim saved by prior default, it will be per-
mitted as "set off" under §431.70 as in other cases (Comm'n. Report,
supra). Where a cause of action is one not required to be asserted in
a cross-complaint under §426.30, there is no requirement that it be
asserted by way of defense under §431.70. [For further discussion of
these sections see 3 WiTKIN, CALIFORNTA PROCEDURE, Pleading § §869-
950, 1021-1023 (2d ed. 1971)].
Time to Respond to Cross-Complaint
Section 432.10 (re: time to respond to cross-complaint) is merely
a continuation of former §442 (re: cross-complaints; time for filing)
that provided a party served with a cross-complaint has 30 days within
which to move, demur, or otherwise plead the cross-complaint in the
same manner as to an original complaint.
Sections 433 and 434 discussed supra, are repealed as superseded
(§433 by §430.30(b) and §434 by §430.80).
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Motion to Strike
Section 435 (re: motion to strike) is amended to make its provi-
sions specifically applicable to cross-complaints. With respect to a
cross-complaint that would have been a cross-complaint under prior
law, §435 continues prior law under former §442 (re: cross-com-
plaints; time of filing). Section 435 also makes clear that a motion to
strike may be directed to a cross-complaint that formerly would have
been asserted as a counterclaim in the answer. According to Comm'n.
Report p. 565, the prior law was not clear on this point (but see CCP
§453, striking sham or irrelevant answer). [see 3 WITKIN, CALIFORNIA
PROCEDURE, Pleading § §860-868 (2d ed. 1971), for further discussion].
Summary Judgments
Sections 437, 437a and 437b have been repealed. Section 437c, deal-
ing with summary judgments, has been amended to apply its provi-
sions to cross-complaints. This has been done by amending the sec-
tion to read that the word "complaint", as used in §437c, shall be con-
strued to include cross-complaint. The phrase "plaintiff's claim" in-
eludes a cause of action, asserted by any party, in a cross-complaint.
[For further discussion of this section see 4 WITKaN, CALIFORNIA PRO-
CEDURE, Proceedings Without Trial §§173-200 (2d ed. 1971)].
Miscellaneous Sections Affected
Various sections of the Code of Civil Procedure and other code
sections have been amended to delete reference to counterclaims,
insert reference to cross-complaints, or have otherwise been re-
vised to conform with these changes. Those sections which have
been included in Chapter 244, but have not already been dis-
cussed, are briefly discussed herein.
Sections 117h (re: statement of a claim in small claims court) and
117r (re: transfer of an action from small claims court when the claim
asserted in a cross-complaint exceeds that court's jurisdiction) have
been amended to delete reference to counterclaims.
Section 471.5 (re: amendment of complaint; filing and service) is
the same as former §432 (re: amended complaint) except that the
time to answer has been increased from 10 to 30 days to conform to
the general rule as to the time within which the defendant must an-
swer.
Section 581 (re: dismissal) is amended to delete reference to "coun-
terclaim" and to seeking affirmative relief in an answer. Affirmative
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relief may not be sought in an answer; rather, where affirmative relief
is sought in the same action on a cross-demand, it must be by cross-
complaint [see Comm'n. Report p. 571-572; §§431.30, 431.70].
Section 583 (re: dismissal; lack of prosecution; failure to bring ac-
tion to trial; exceptions) is amended to delete the reference to a "coun-
terclaim".
Section 626 (re: actions or counterclaims for recovery of money) is
amended to substitute "cross-complaint" for, and delete reference to,
a counterclaim. Section 631.8 (re: motion for judgment; effect) is
amended to omit reference to counterclaim. Section 666 (re: judg-
ment on counterclaim exceeding plaintiff's demand; affirmative relief;
remission of amount in excess of jurisdiction) is amended to omit ref-
erence to counterclaim and substitute reference to cross-complaint.
Section 871.2 (re: definition of person) makes technical non-sub-
stantive change by replacing reference to "section" with "chapter".
Section 871.3 (re: authority to bring action or file cross-demand) and
§871.5 (re: adjustment of rights, equities and interests of parties)
are amended to omit reference to counterclaims. Section 396 (re:
court without jurisdiction) is also amended to delete reference to coun-
terclaims.
Section 1048 (re: severance or consolidation of trial) is amended
to conform in substance to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 42.
The amendment makes clear that the court may sever causes of action
for trial, and also, that the court may sever issues for trial. Formerly
§1048 provided that "an action may be severed" by the court, but did
not specifically authorize the severance of issues for trial [Conim'n.
Report pp. 575-576]. Absent some specific statute dealing with the
particular situation, the law was unclear whether issues could be se-
vered for trial. Note, however, that §1048 permits the court to sever
issues for trial. It does not affect any statute that requires that a par-
ticular issue be severed for trial. Also according to the Comm'n. Re-
port, (supra), the authority to sever issues for trial under §1048 may
duplicate similar authority given under other statutes dealing with par-
ticular issues. These sections have been retained because they include
useful procedural details which continue to apply [e.g., CCP §597
(separate trial of special defenses not involving merits), CCP §598
(separate trial of issue of liability before trial of other issues)]. [For
further discussion see Comm'n. Report pp. 575-576; FED. R. CIV. PROC.
42; Cook v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. App. 3d 832 (1971)].
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Civil Code §1692 (re: assertion of recission of a contract by cross-
complaint) is amended to delete reference to counterclaim.
Revenue and Taxation Code Sections 3522 and 3810 and Water
Code Sections 26304, 26305, 37161, 37162 and 5106 have all been
amended to delete any reference to counterclaims.
See Generally:
1) CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION CoMmssION, Recommendation and Study Relating to
Counterclaims and Cross-complaints, Joinder of Causes of Action, and Re-
lated Provisions (1970).
2) Friedenthal, Joinder of Claims, Counterclaims, and Cross-complaints: Suggested
Revision of the California Provisions, 23 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1970).
Civil Procedure; joinder of defendants
Code of Civil Procedure §379 (amended).
SB 953 (Song); STATS 1971, Ch 950
(Effective July 1, 1972)
Section 379(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure was repealed by
Chapter 244, Stats 1971 (effective July 1, 1972), which revised the
law governing pleading and joinder [discussed in this Volume at
p. 241]. The provisions of §379(c) provide that where the plaintiff is
in doubt as to the person from whom he is entitled redress, he may
join two or more defendants, with the intent that the question as to
which, if any, of the defendants is liable, and to what extent, may be
determined between the parties; this provision was not reenacted in
Chapter 244.
Subsequent to the introduction of SB 201 (Chapter 244), a court
decision in Landau v. Salem, 4 Cal. 3d 901 (1971), interpreted
§379(c). The California Law Revision Commission indicated that the
language of §379(c) should be retained, and therefore Chapter 953
reenacts such language. Chapter 953 will become operative on July
1, 1972 (to coincide with the operative date of Chapter 244).
Civil Procedure; attorney's fees
Government Code §800 (new).
AB 1074 (Stull); STATS 1971, Ch 1655
Chapter 1655 adds §800 to the Government Code to provide that in
any civil action to appeal or review the award, finding, or other determi-
nation of any administrative proceeding under the Government Code or
under any other provision of state law, except actions resulting from
actions of the State Board of Control, where it is shown that the award,
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finding, or other determination of such proceeding was the result of ar-
bitrary or capricious action or conduct by a public entity or an officer
thereof in his official capacity, the complainant if he prevails in the
civil action may collect reasonable attorney's fees, but not to exceed
$1,500, where he is personally obligated to pay such fees, from such
public entity, in addition to any other relief granted or other costs
awarded.
Section 800 is ancillary only, and is not to be construed to create a
new cause of action.
Refusal by a public entity or officer thereof to admit liability pursu-
ant to a contract of insurance shall not be considered arbitrary or ca-
pricious action or conduct within the meaning of this section.
See Generally:
1) 3 WrrITN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Appeal §200 (1954).
Civil Procedure; dismissal for failure to appear
Code of Civil Procedure §581 (amended).
AB 1418 (Warren); STATS 1971, Ch 1534
Code of Civil Procedure §581 lists the situations in which an action
may be dismissed. The list is amended to provide that the court may
dismiss the action without prejudice when no party appears for trial
following 30 days notice of time and place for same.
Chapter 1534 amended §581 twice. One version still makes refer-
ence to counterclaims and will be in effect until July 1, 1972. Coun-
terclaims will no longer be viable pleadings as of July 1, 1972, at which
time the version of this chapter that makes no reference to counter-
claims will be in force.
See Generally:
1) 4 WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Proceedings Without Trial §§43-123 (7th
ed. 1960).
Civil Procedure; disqualification of judges
Code of Civil Procedure § 170 (amended).
AB 941 (Hayes); STATS 1971, Ch 807
Section 170 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides the grounds
for disqualification of a judge or justice at the appellate and trial level.
Chapter 807 amends this section by making a technical correction of
reference to the period of time within which a judge or justice may
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answer a specified written statement of objection to, and disqualifica-
tion of, such judge from five days to 10 days.
See Generally:
1) 1 W1TKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Courts §59 (2d ed. 1970).
2) REVIEW OF SELECTED 1969 CODE LEGISLATION, CONTINUING EDUCATION OF TIlE
BAR 63.
Civil Procedure; age of jurors
Code of Civil Procedure §198 (amended).
AB 334 (Warren); STATS 1971, Ch 1690
Chapter 1690 amends Section 198 of the Code of Civil Procedure
by reducing the requisite age of a juror from 21 years to 18 years.
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